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Abstract: This study investigates the factors that determine producers’ participation in 
agri-environmental advisory activities and their adoption of best management practices 
(BMPs) in Quebec (Canada). Data were collected from farmers in telephone interviews 
and the impacts of agri-environmental extension activities were analysed using average 
treatment effect and local average treatment effect, estimated with non-parametric 
approaches. The average effects of agri-environmental extension activities are statistically 
significant for the majority of BMPs. We also find a statistically significant formal 
diffusion effect of producer‘s membership in an agri-environmental advisory club. The 
informal diffusion effect is statistically significant for BMPs that need specific knowledge.  
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Agri-environmental Advisory Activities and Best Management Practices Adoption 
 
1. Introduction 
Concerns about climate change, biodiversity and water pollution have heightened interest in 
mitigating the environmental consequences of agriculture through best management 
practices (BMPs). However, given the voluntary nature of the adoption of most 
conservation practices, farmers need to decide whether to adopt BMPs or not. Agri-
environmental extension activities attracted considerable interest because of their ability to 
improve the performance of producers in the delivery of ecological goods and services 
(EGS) through BMPs. The farms’ response to agri-environmental extension activities is 
thus a critical factor in determining the relative merits of alternative policies, together with 
key factors that govern BMP adoption, and ultimately, the supply of EGS.  
There is a large body of literature regarding the determinants of adoption of BMPs in 
agriculture. Prokopy et al. (2008) provide a detailed survey with a focus on the United 
States. They review 25 years of literature to examine general trends in the categories of 
capacity, awareness, attitudes and farm characteristics. They conclude “…the results are 
clearly inconclusive on what factors consistently determine BMP adoption” (p. 308).  
Rogers (2003) asserts that social systems can be characterized as heterophilous or 
homophilous. Heterophilous social systems tend to encourage interactions between people 
from different backgrounds, in a vertical and formal linkage system. In homophilous social 
systems, most interactions are between people from similar backgrounds in a horizontal 
system. People and ideas that differ from the norm thus appear strange and undesirable. In a 
BMP adoption setting, that effect contains important policy information for public policy 
planning (Case, 1992). Darr and Pretzsch (2006) and Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) find 
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that formal and informal groups are important even if they do not know whether it is the 
access to information provided through social networks or the influence of social networks 
on subjective norms that affects adoption behaviour.  
A major methodological problem that has not been addressed sufficiently by many of the 
previous studies on BMP adoption is the bias related to potential participation in formal and 
informal groups’ activities. The correlation between participation in activities and BMP 
adoption could be due to a positive effect caused by participation in activities. There could 
also be a self-selection effect if farmers that already have more positive environmental 
attitudes than their peers participate more eagerly in such activities (see Salhofer and 
Streicher, 2005). To resolve this selectivity problem, one could use an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach, which uses an instrument that is correlated with participation in 
activities but is uncorrelated with BMP adoption.1 However, identification and estimation is 
more complicated when the partial effect depends on unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, 
farmers have different attitudes towards new technologies, risk and uncertainty, all of 
which might influence their adoption decision. Therefore, adopters and non-adopters may 
differ significantly in unobserved variables, which might lead to bias when analysing BMP 
adoption (Strauss et al., 1991; Owens, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2003; Feder, Murgai and 
Quizon, 2004). The focus is typically on estimating the average partial effect, that is the 
partial effect averaged across the population distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.2 
When the endogenous variable is binary, for example, participation in a program, the 
                                                 
1 In the first step, one would estimate an equation describing the participation in advisory activities and use 
this to calculate the inverse Mills ratio and include it in the adoption equation as an additional explanatory 
variable (Heckman, 1979). The coefficient of the Mills ratio can be seen as the value added to the extension 
activities through the BMPs’ adoption. The study by Rejesus et al. (2009) is a recent application of this 
method. Crost et al. (2007) use fixed effects to control for the selectivity problem. This approach cannot be 
used in situations where only cross-sectional data are available.  
2 A popular model where the endogenous explanatory variable interacts with unobserved heterogeneity is the 
switching regression model (e.g., Maddala, 1983), which has received considerable attention recently in the 
program evaluation literature. 
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average partial effect is called the average treatment effect. This concept, introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is based on the fact that only one of the potential outcomes 
is ever observed for each producer. In the setting of a voluntary program where those not 
enrolled will never be required to participate in the program, the average treatment effect 
on treated (ATT) is the estimand of most interest (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).  
The aim of the paper is to identify how agri-environmental extension activities in the 
province of Quebec (Canada) affect the adoption of BMPs by a farmer compared with what 
he would have experienced had he not participated. We use the concept of ATT to evaluate 
the effect of extension activities on the adoption of BMPs. The estimated ATT is the 
expected effect on BMP adoption of extension activities on a farm randomly drawn from 
the subpopulation of farms that participate in extension activities (Wooldridge, 2002). In 
addition, we quantify the potential vertical (i.e. formal) and horizontal (i.e. informal) 
diffusion effects on BMP adoption of the agri-environmental advisory clubs. We do so 
using the concept of local average treatment effect (LATE) suggested by Imbens and 
Angrist (1994). The LATE measures the average treatment effect among producers who 
decide to participate in agri-environmental activities because of the activities of the 
advisory clubs.  
Our estimations show that for most of the studied BMPs, both extension activities and the 
advisory clubs have a positive statistically significant impact on the probability of BMPs 
adoption. Nevertheless, the advisory clubs network has a lesser effect on the probability of 
establishing and maintaining a riparian buffer zone, and on the immediate incorporation of 
manure. In addition, we found an informal relationship, i.e. the possible horizontal 
diffusion effect of the advisory clubs for the BMPs that require most advanced knowledge. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes agri-
environmental extension activities in the province of Quebec while Section 3 presents our 
empirical approach. Section 4 outlines aspects of our data and Section five presents and 
discusses the results of the estimations. The last section concludes the paper.   
 
2. Institutional background: agri-environmental extension activities in Quebec  
In June 2002, the Québec government adopted the Regulation Respecting Agricultural 
Operations to address the non-point source pollution problem (Éditeur officiel du Québec, 
2002). Its provisions took immediate effect for new facilities and for the expansion of 
existing ones. Other farms were given until 2010 to fully comply. In November 2002, the 
Quebec government adopted the Quebec Water Policy to ensure a better framework for 
water management and to guarantee the sustainability of the resource (MENV, 2002). 
Because agricultural activities may have a major impact on natural resources, the farming 
sector is expected to play a significant role in compliance with water quality standards. The 
water policy also sets forth commitments to intensifying agricultural clean-up efforts 
complementary to the Regulation respecting agricultural operations. In addition, in 2003, 
the government of Quebec adopted a directive on odours caused by manure from 
agricultural activities and a code on pesticide management. The latter introduces standards 
to regulate the use, sale and storage of pesticides with the objective of reducing human 
exposure.  
To help farmers adapt to all these regulations, in 2004, the Quebec Department of 
Agriculture (Ministère de l’agriculture des pêcheries et de l’alimentation du Québec) 
launched a “farm-by-farm” agri-environmental strategy based on a comprehensive 
environmental tool called the agri-environmental support plan. It is the provincial 
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equivalent of the federal environmental farm plan. The support plan involves obtaining a 
comprehensive portrait of a farm’s agri-environmental situation, formulating an action plan 
and implementing the solutions described in the support plan. The disposal capacity of 
fertilizers, whether a farm’s agri-environmental practices comply with regulatory 
requirements; and other farming practices that involve the environment (e.g., erosion 
control, odour reduction and optimization of pesticide use) are evaluated. During the 
process, the priorities identified by the farm and its particular business features are taken 
into account (MAPAQ, 2003). It is a voluntary process done either with or without the 
assistance of an advisor from an agri-environmental advisory club.  
The creation of advisory clubs in 1993 was inspired by various agri-environmental 
initiatives by Quebec farmers. Consultations conducted in 1996 showed that the advisory 
clubs successfully educated and engaged farmers in sustainable agriculture. The Quebec 
Department of Agriculture and the farmers’ union (Union des producteurs agricoles, UPA 
hereafter) were eager to make agri-environmental advisory activities accessible to more 
farmers. In 2008, the advisory club network had more than 8,300 members grouped into 83 
clubs, served by more than 300 advisors.3 Activities of advisory clubs relate to guidance for 
management of fertilizer, reducing pesticide use, including methods of integrated pest 
management, cultural practices for conservation, management and protection of 
watercourses. The approach used combines activities oriented toward individual producers 
                                                 
3 A partnership agreement between the Quebec Department of Agriculture and UPA on advisory services for 
sustainable development of farms, whose general objective is to develop and offer advisory services, came 
into effect on April 1, 2009 and will end on March 31, 2013 (see  
http://www.clubsconseils.org/accueil/affichage.asp?B=745, accessed on February 8, 2010). The Prime-Vert 
program provides financial assistance for the agri-environment advisory services. It also targets the purchase 
of odour-reduction equipment and non-point source pollution by providing financial assistance to encourage 
specific management practices such as soil conservation, windbreaks, winter cover crops,… A portion of the 
Prime-Vert funding is provided by the federal government of Canada through its strategic agricultural 
framework (Boutin, 2005). 
  
 
7
and group activities. They include individual support for developing plans (fertilization 
plans, rotation plans, management plans for riparian buffers), advisories to achieve balance 
(phosphorus and nutrient balance) and soil sampling. Groups’ activities may include 
training, demonstration and information, and visits to leading farms. These activities allow 
farmers to share their knowledge and aim to clarify agri-environmental issues farms are 
facing.  
Since 2004, the advisors in the advisory clubs have used the support plan in their daily 
work. The February 2008 Report by the Commission sur l’avenir de l’agriculture et de 
l’agroalimentaire du Québec indicates that the progress of Quebec farmers in protecting the 
environment is largely due to the fact that they have been able to rely on the advice of 
experts who understand their needs and who helped them formulate and implement agri-
environmental support plans (CAAAQ, 2008). There are two dimensions to consider when 
trying to evaluate the impacts of advisory activities on the adoption of BMPs in Quebec: 
the relevance of agri-environmental support plans as a tool to improve farmers’ 
environmental practices and the efficacy of the advisory clubs as a way to persuade 
producers to adopt a support plan, and ultimately, to improve their environmental practices. 
 
3. Estimation methods  
The dominance of family businesses is an important characteristic of the farm sector in 
Quebec (CAAAQ, 2008). It complicates the theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact 
of agri-environmental extension activities. Decisions relating to production, consumption, 
and leisure for family members must be made simultaneously. Moreover, the reduction of 
pollutants following the adoption of BMP affects the welfare of producers through both 
their production function and their health. Costs and benefits ought to differ between 
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individuals depending on specific characteristics of the farm and depending on the 
characteristics of the farmer, some of which, however, may not be fully observed 
(unobserved heterogeneity). We should not expect to find responses to extension activities 
to be homogenous across individual farms. Participation in extension activities is typically 
voluntary, introducing another potential unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we estimate 
the treatment effect averaged across the population distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity using non-parametric approaches.4,5 These approaches avoid delicate 
assumptions about functional form and independence. In addition, the endogeneity of 
regressors that are not of main interest may not affect the estimated relationship between 
the regressor of interest and the outcome (Frölich, 2006). We rely on the non-parametric 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation of local average treatment effect with covariates 
proposed by Frölich (2007) to estimate the potential vertical. i.e. heterophilous, diffusion 
effect of the advisory clubs. Applying Frölich’s (2007) approach, we allow for confounding 
factors, that is, factors that influence the potential probability of adopting a given BMP and 
the decision to adopt a support plan and the decision to be a member of an advisory club. 
We then try to mitigate some of the difficulties of improper instrumental variables resulting 
from inadequate covariates. As Oréopoulos (2006: p. 152) notes, “…when responses to 
treatment vary, different instruments measure different effects…” We exploit this fact and 
use “vicinity” as an instrumental variable for the informal, i.e. homophilous, diffusion 
impact of the advisory clubs.  
                                                 
4 Most models assume additive separability in the error term; hence, they assume a constant treatment effect 
for individual farms with the same value of covariates (e.g. Rejesus et al., 2009). Additively separable models 
thus rule out unobserved heterogeneity and are not appropriate given the issues of the study at hand. 
5 Non-parametric empirical applications of treatment effect models when evaluating policies in the 
agricultural context are limited. Examples are Godtland et al. (2004), Lynch, Gray and Geoghegan (2007), 
Lynch and Liu (2007) and Pufahl and Weiss (2009). 
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Measuring the impact of agri-environmental extension activities on BMP adoption  
Participation in agri-environmental extension activities is modeled as a discrete choice 
taking the value of 1 if the producer has a support plan and 0 otherwise. The estimated 
average treatment effect is the expected effect on the outcome (adoption of the BMP) that 
producers have gained because of their participation in extension activities (treatment). 
However, given the voluntary nature of participation in extension activities, the estimated 
average treatment effect on the treated is of greatest interest (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009). The ATT is the expected effect that participants in extension activities have 
experienced because of their participation:  
(1) ( ) ( )1 0| , 1 | , 1ATT E s E s= = − =x x   
where { }0,1∈  is the adoption variable taking the value of 1  when the BMP is adopted 
and 0  when it is not; x  the vector of farms’ and farmers’ characteristics; { }0,1s∈  shows 
whether the producer has a support plan ( )1s  or not ( )0s  and is assumed to be endogenous. 
The treatment effect is estimated non-parametrically using propensity-score matching 
estimators (Frölich, 2006). 
 
Measuring the impact of the agri-environmental advisory clubs on BMP adoption 
Producers can be distinguished into four types according to their reaction at an external 
intervention, i.e. an instrument (see Imbens and Ingrist, 1994): never-participant, complier, 
defier and always-participant (Table 1). The compliers are farmers who adopted a support 
plan because of an external intervention. Consistent with Imbens and Ingrist’s (1994) 
definition, the estimated LATE measures the expected effect of participation in extension 
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activities (treatment) on the probability of adopting a BMP (the outcome) because of 
external intervention. The LATE is:  
(2) 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
| , 1 | , 0
| , 1 | , 0
E z E z
LATE
E s z E s z
= − =
=
= − =
x x
x x
 
 
where { }0,1z =  is the instrumental variable taking the value of 1 or 0; the other variables 
have been defined above. The LATE is estimated using a propensity score matching 
estimator (Frölich, 2007; Frölich and Lechner, 2010).6 Aside from the estimated LATE, the 
fractions of compliers ( )c  and never-participants ( )n  are estimands of interest for public 
policy planning. They are given, respectively, by equations (3) and (4): 
(3) ( ) [ ] [ ]Pr | | , 1 | , 0c E s z E s zϖ = = = − =x x x  
(4) ( ) [ ]Pr | 1 | , 1n E s zϖ = = − =x x  
where ϖ  represents producers’ types according to their reaction to the instrument. IV does 
not identify the expected average treatment effects for the always-participants ( )a  and the 
never-participants. Nevertheless, using the results of Frölich and Lechner (2010), we can 
identify the expected treatment outcome for the always-participants by 
(5) 
[ ]
[ ]
1 | , 0|
| , 0
E s z
E a
E s z
ϖ
⋅ =
 = =  =
x
x

  
and the control outcome of the never-participants by 
(6) 
( )
( )
0
1 | , 1
|
1 | , 1
E s z
E n
E s z
ϖ
⋅ − =   = =  − =  
x
x

  
 
                                                 
6 The ATT and the LATE are estimated using the Gauss codes of Frölich available at http://froelich.vwl.uni-
mannheim.de/1357.0.html?&L=1.  Accessed March 3, 2009. 
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Measuring vertical diffusion effects 
The vertical, i.e. heterophilous, linkage that can increase access to information and BMP 
adoption is studied using membership in an advisory club as instrument. Using membership 
as an instrument for participation in extension activities, assuming that membership is 
exogenous from adoption, will return the effect of extension activities for farms whose 
adoption is highly affected by membership. These farms are likely to respond more 
significantly to a change in participation status than the average farm. 
 
Measuring horizontal diffusion effects 
The horizontal, i.e. homophilous, diffusion effects of the agri-environmental advisory clubs 
network is estimated using the “vicinity” as the instrumental variable. To construct this 
variable, producers who are not members of an advisory club had to answer the following 
survey question: “Do you know a producer, friend or neighbour who is a member of an 
agri-environmental advisory club?” Nevertheless, regardless of whether living close to or 
far from a member of an advisory club is an active choice, that choice might be related to 
characteristics that affect the decision to adopt a given BMP or not. The estimated LATE 
measures the expected impact in adoption caused by the participation in extension activities 
because of the “neighbourhood effect.”7  
 
Implementation procedure 
Our implementation procedure follows Frölich (2004, 2007) and is described in Frölich and 
Lechner (2010). The propensity score is derived from a Probit model. Bandwidth values are 
                                                 
7 In Case (1992) and Holloway, Shankar and Rahman (2002) the term “neighbours” refers to all farmers 
living in the same district. Halloway et al. (2002). The authors use spatial econometrics to estimate 
“neighborhood effects” in high-yielding variety adoption among Bangladeshi rice producers. 
  
 
12
selected by leave-one-out least squares cross-validation for the nonparametric regression. 
With the selected bandwidth, treatment effects are estimated non-parametrically using ridge 
matching. Usually, ridge matching was the best estimator (lower mean square error) 
particularly in small samples (Frölich, 2004).  
In line with Viet (2008), Frölich and Lechner (2010) and Behrman, Cheng and Todd 
(2004), confidence intervals (CI) of the treatment effects are simulated using bootstrapping 
methods. The bootstrap consisted of drawing with replacement from the original sample 
and repeating 999 times the entire estimation process (see Brownstone and Valleta, 2001; 
Wooldridge, 2002).8  
 
4. Data description 
Data are from a survey and the coordinates of the farms were provided by Ministère de 
l’agriculture, des pêcheries et de l’alimentation du Québec (MAPAQ) upon authorization 
from the Commission on Access to Information. Data are from a survey implemented 
between February and March 2009. The year of reference was 2008 and the dataset consists 
of 200 observations. The survey targeted agricultural enterprises (i) registered in the 
MAPAQ farms dataset and (ii) deriving their main revenue from milk production, beef 
cattle, hogs, poultry, sheep, crops, vegetables, potatoes, apples, berries and tobacco. We use 
a stratified random plan as the sampling method. The main production of the farm forms 
the different strata. The portrait of Quebec producers formed the basis of the sampling 
strategy. Table A1 defines the variables used and their corresponding summary statistics.   
                                                 
8 See Politis, Wolf and Romano (1999) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a proof of the validity of this 
subsampling approach. 
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The support plan is modelled as a discrete choice taking the value of one when the producer 
has a support plan and zero otherwise. 47.37% of producers have a support plan and 36% 
are members of an advisory club. In addition, 40.34% of producers that are not members of 
an advisory club claimed to have a neighbour or a friend that is a member. In that case, the 
variable vicinity takes the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. As a covariate, producers and farm 
attributes are taken into account as well as some external characteristics. 
Six BMPs are analysed and are all introduced through binary variables that take the value 
of 1 if the BMP is adopted and 0 otherwise. The BMP studied first is related to compliance 
with the regulatory norms concerning manure analyses; it is supposed to be in effect in 
2010. The BMP takes the value of 1 if the analysis was done in the last 12 months for 
manure and 5 years for soil. Producer adoption decisions regarding conservation tillage are 
studied. Consistent with Davey and Furtan (2008), we define conservation tillage as tillage 
that retains most of the previous crop residue on the soil surface, including zero tillage. The 
BMP associated with the management of manure takes the value of 1 when the manure is 
injected into the soil within 24 hours of the initial spreading and 0 otherwise. The 
establishment and maintenance of a riparian buffer zone takes a value of 1 when a riparian 
buffer zone larger than one metre is established and maintained and 0 otherwise. The BMP 
related to the use of mineral fertilizers is studied. It takes the value of 1 if the producers do 
not use mineral fertilizers. Otherwise, the value is zero. Finally, investment in the 
construction of run-off control structures (hydraulic infrastructures) is studied.  
Table 2 presents a preliminary analysis of the BMPs. For the studied BMPs, it compares 
proportions of adopters between the subpopulations of producers with and without a 
support plan. Table 2 shows that the differences in proportion of adopters are significant, at 
a level of 5%.  
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Factors affecting participation in agri-environmental extension activities 
Factors affecting the decision to participate in agri-environmental extension activities, 
proxied by the adoption of a support plan, are estimated using a Probit. Table A2 presents 
the results. Results show that age has a negative impact for one class while that effect is 
statistically non-significant for the other classes. Farmers aged between 45 and 55 are found 
to have a 44.1% lower probability of participating in extension activities compared with 
farmers age 45 and under. Farmers that have completed secondary school have a higher 
probability of participating, as are farmers who have more experience with farm 
management. When a farmer possesses environmental awareness, this increases the 
probability of deciding to have a support plan by 27.4%. Kaiser, Wolfing and Fuhrer (1999) 
indicate that awareness of environmental concerns usually precedes the adoption of a 
desirable attitude toward the issue of interest. However, Kaiser et al. (1999) do not find a 
strong relationship between behaviour and awareness. In the context of developing 
countries, Ecobichon (2001) and Heong et al. (2002) also report a general awareness of 
chemical inputs’ secondary effects, but this does not necessarily influence farmers’ 
production behaviour. Tucker and Napier (2001) find that even if some Midwestern US 
farmers were aware of the potentially negative consequences of chemical input use, this 
awareness does not necessarily influence farmers’ production behaviour.  
Only the smallest farms, i.e., with TGR below $50,000, have a lower probability of 
adopting a support plan. They are 30.4% less likely to use a support plan than the median 
class. For the other classes of TGR, the differences are statistically non-significant. It is 
also the case for bovine, milk, hog and cereal production. However, there is a difference for 
the other animal and crop production, with respective probabilities of participating in 
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extension activities 39.8% and 37% lower, compared with hog production, the base 
production. As expected, having observed soil degradation has a positive marginal effect; it 
increases the probability of having a support plan by 23.5%. Finally, the degradation of 
rivers and the geographical location of the farm have a statistically non-significant effect on 
the probability of having a support plan.  
 
Evidence of heterogeneity of participation in extension activities 
Figure 1 presents a histogram of the propensity scores for adopters and non-adopters of the 
selected BMPs. For most of the selected BMPs, it clearly supports the idea of 
heterogeneous treatment effects of the adoption of a support plan; high propensity scores 
are associated with adoption, as are low propensity scores. The same is observed for non-
adoption. 
 
Balancing test 
A “balancing test” reveals whether the comparison groups created with the propensity score 
sufficiently resemble the treatment groups. We follow Godtland et al. (2004) and perform a 
balancing test by dividing each comparison and treatment group into two strata, ordered by 
propensity scores. Within each stratum, a t-test of equality of means in the two samples of 
participants and non-participants was conducted for each control variable. The results of 
these tests are reported in Table 3. The null was not rejected for the majority of variables. 
These results indicate no systematic differences between the “treated” farmers, i.e. farmers 
with a support plan, and the comparison group in their observed characteristics. 
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4.2. Average effect of agri-environmental extension activities  
For each studied BMP, the estimated average treatment effect on treated measures the 
impact of agri-environmental extension activities on the expected probability of adopting 
for the subgroup of producers who have a support plan. A positive ATT value suggests that 
the subgroup of producers with a support plan have a greater probability of adopting 
because of it. Table 4 reports ATT and their corresponding bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals.  
The average positive impact is higher for the immediate incorporation of manure. The value 
of 0.093 indicates that participating in extension activities increases the probability of 
adopting the BMP by 9.3%. A possible explanation is that extension activities can show 
that adopting immediate incorporation of manure can generate private gains (specifically 
material and energy savings) as well as environmental gains (reduction of pollutants, e.g., 
phosphorus and nitrogen, and of manure odours). In addition, as reported by Deaton et al. 
(2005) diligence in environmental protection has become a major consideration for farmers 
because of growth in rural residential. Producers face less understandings vis-à-vis 
production practice with visible environmental impact, which is the case of manure 
spreading. The average positive impact on the adoption of the non-use of mineral fertilizers 
is also notable at 5.9% respectively. This result corresponds to Pufahl and Weiss (2009), 
who observe a 9.4% reduction in fertilizer expenditures when studying the impact of agri-
environmental programs in Germany. Participation in extension activities increase the 
probability to establishment and maintain a riparian buffer zone by 2% even if, from an 
individual landowner’s perspective, benefits may not clearly outweigh costs when 
establishing and maintaining such a zone (see Brethour et al., 2007). But, as mentioned by 
footnote #3, producers receive financial support when implementing riparian buffers. For 
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conservation tillage, although statistically significant, the positive impact of extension 
activities is lower at 1.3%. This could be due to the mixed results of studies of the impact 
of this BMP on the profitability of farms. Smith et al. (1996) indicates that conservation 
tillage is not economically competitive, while Mooney and Williams (2007) show that, 
under some circumstances, it is. The average impact on the adoption of manure analyses is 
the low at 1%. This is an unexpected result because this BMP is related to compliance with 
the incoming regulatory norms. Finally, participation in extension activities has no 
statistically significant impact on the probability to construct hydraulic infrastructures to 
control soil erosion. 
Overall, our results show that, for most of the studied BMPs, the support plan reached its 
objective, i.e., to help producers enhance their environmental performance. 
 
4.3. Average effects of agri-environmental advisory clubs 
Average heterophilous effect of agri-environmental advisory clubs  
The estimated fraction of never-participants is 0.283 with a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.156; 
0.429]. It indicates that 28.3% of farmers who do not participate in agri-environmental 
extension activities will not change their status even if they join an agri-environmental 
advisory club. Compliers are farmers who use a support plan because they belong to an 
advisory club. In a cost-benefit analysis of the advisory clubs network, this estimand is 
important. Their estimated fraction is 0.344 with a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.185; 0.484]. 
This result indicates that over one-third of producers in the database react to membership in 
an advisory club by adopting a support plan. The always-participants comprise slightly 
more than one-third of producers. 
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Table 5 reports the results of the estimated LATEs of compliers with their corresponding 
95% confidence intervals. The estimated LATEs are positive and statistically significant for 
all the studied BMPs, indicating a vertical linkage that increases access to information, 
spread of ideas and the adoption of BMPs. The values of the ATT (see Table 4) and the 
LATE (see Table 5) are different, indicating that adherence to an advisory club has a non-
homogenous impact on participation in extension activities. Although the advisory clubs 
have adopted the support plan as a working tool, the estimated LATEs provide only a 
measure of the effectiveness of the network.9  
Manure analysis realization is the BMP with the greatest average impact of membership in 
an advisory club. The result of 47.8% (LATE=0.478) is the expected mean effect on the 
probability of adoption of manure analyses for farmers that decide to use a support plan 
because they belong to an advisory club. The probability of adoption is, on average, 
augmented by 47.8%. This is quite a large effect but it is expected because this BMP is 
related to compliance with regulatory norms that will be in place in 2010. In a report on the 
evaluation of the agri-environmental advisory clubs activities, Sogémap (2007) indicates 
that adherence is largely due to regulatory reasons, at 67%. The estimated LATE of the 
adoption of conservation tillage, the non-use of mineral fertilizers and the construction of 
hydraulic infrastructures are also important, indicating a statistically significant effect of the 
advisory clubs activities on the level of adoption. These results are consistent with Sobels, 
Curtis and Lokie (2001), who find that increases in social capital play a role in the success 
of the Landcare program in Australia. Estimates indicate lower effects for the injection of 
manure into the soil within 24 hours of the initial spreading and riparian buffer zone 
                                                 
9 As mentioned by Heckman (1997: p 456), the LATE assumes that the external intervention has no effect on 
non-switchers. 
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establishment and maintenance: 25.2% and 6.7% respectively. The latter effect is lower 
than the result of Ghazalian, Larue and West (2009) who report that belonging to a club 
augments the probability of establishing and maintaining a riparian buffer by 16%.10 
Nevertheless, Prokopy et al. (2008) report an inconclusive relationship between networking 
and the decision to adopt some of the BMPs related to livestock management, landscape 
management and soil management. 
Table A4 shows that, for all the studied BMPs, compliers benefit more from the activities 
of the advisory clubs. For example, for manure analyses, the treatment outcome for the 
always-participants is 0.763, while it is 0.821 for the compliers. Interestingly, the control 
outcome for the never-participants is 0.476 while it is 0.342 for the compliers. This result 
indicates that the never-participants group consists of producers who are more likely to 
implement manure analyses without advisors assistance. Excepted the riparian buffer zone 
establishment and maintenance, the results presented in Table A4 are similar for the other 
studied BMPs. From policy-makers’ perspective, these findings suggest that the agreement 
between Quebec Department of Agriculture and UPA on advisory services for sustainable 
development of farms is probably cost effective for the subgroup of compliers. 
  
Average homophilous effect of agri-environmental advisory clubs 
The estimated fraction of never-participants is 0.460 with a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.393; 
0.524]. It indicates that 46% of farmers who do not participate in extension activities will 
not change their status even if they share “vicinity” with a member of an advisory club. The 
estimated fraction of compliers is 0.220 with a bootstrapped 95% CI of [0.044; 0.38], lower 
                                                 
10 Ghazalian et al. (2009) use Bayesian estimation methods and do not address the potential endogeneity and 
self-selection issues in their study.  
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than for those who have a membership in an advisory club. 22% of farmers in the database 
react to “vicinity” by adopting a support plan. 
Table 6 reports the horizontal diffusion impact of the advisory clubs. For the entire 
population of producers, we try to identify the gain from knowing at least one member of 
an advisory club. Positive impacts are found for the manure analyses, the construction of 
hydraulic infrastructures and the non-use of mineral fertilizers at 2.1%, 10.5% and 13.1% 
respectively. For these BMPs, neighbourhood effect results to a higher probability to 
adopt.11 Interestingly, the implementation of these 3 BMPs needs specific knowledge. The 
non-significant impact for riparian buffer implementation is expected, given the results of 
the formal diffusion effects. Our results show a negative impact of “vicinity” on the 
conservation tillage. We had no expectations about the direction of the impact of “vicinity” 
because of the mixed results of the economic studies on the profitability of conservation 
tillage. “Vicinity” has a non-significant impact on the implementation of manure 
incorporation. We expected a positive impact because of the ability of the visible 
environmental gain (e.g. reduction of manure odours) of this BMP. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigated the factors determining producers’ participation in agri-
environmental extension services and its impact on the adoption of various best 
management practices (BMPs). The participation in agri-environmental extension activities 
                                                 
11 Halloway et al. (2002) found a “neighborhood effect” significantly different from zero. Defrancesco et al. 
(2007) also suggest that local behavioural influences have to be taken into account when designing and 
communicating agri-environmental measures. They define conditional non-adopters as farmers who 
participate because of easier-to-fit measures and higher payments. The local community and more particularly 
by neighbouring farmers negatively influence conditional non-adopters while positively influencing actives 
participants (for both financial and environmental protection reasons). Our results show that, as expected,   
“neighborhood effects” is also BMP specific.   
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is proxied by Quebec farmers’ adoption of an agri-environmental support plan. Data were 
collected from farmers through telephone interviews conducted in February and March 
2009. Collected data include producer and farm characteristics, along with external features 
that can affect participation in agri-environmental extension activities. We analyse the link 
between participation in agri-environmental extension activities and the adoption of six 
BMPs, as well as the link between BMP adoption and the agri-environmental advisory 
clubs network.    
The average impacts of the agri-environmental extension activities on BMP adoption are 
estimated using average treatment effect on treated. In most of the BMPs, extension 
activities have a positive statistically significant impact on the probability of adopting, with 
a higher effect for the immediate incorporation of manure within 24 hours of initial 
spreading. The agri-environmental advisory clubs’ impact on the probability of adopting 
BMPs is estimated using the concepts of local average treatment effect. Membership in an 
advisory club is used as instrumental variable when studying the vertical linkage 
(heterophilous, i.e., people with dissimilar characteristics) that increases adoption. The 
advisory clubs were found to have a statistically significant positive effect for most of the 
studied BMPs. Nevertheless, it has no effect on the probability of establishing and 
maintaining a riparian buffer zone, nor on the immediate incorporation of manure. In 
addition, the informal relationship, i.e. the possible horizontal diffusion effect of the 
advisory clubs is studied using “vicinity” as an instrumental variable. In doing so, we use 
the fact that, in the local average treatment effect, different instruments measure different 
effects. We found a positive significant diffusion effect for only 3 of the studied BMPs. 
The number of observations used in the present study limits the extent to which the results 
can be generalized but, clearly, our results suggest that agri-environmental extension 
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activities and advisory clubs play an important role in disseminating information, raising 
awareness of BMP adoption and ultimately on the supply of ecological goods and services. 
The results also confirm that, like most of the other factors affecting BMP adoption, the 
treatment effects are “BMP-specific.” Even if the non-parametric approach used in the 
present study is based on the assumption of appropriate control variables and instruments, 
we consider it a useful technique for empirical evaluation of extension activities or 
institutions. It provides an adequate way of dealing with the potential endogeneity and 
treatment heterogeneity issues of the extension and advisory activities when analysing their 
impact on the supply of EGS. Our results suggest that governmental policies that invest in 
social capital may help create a sufficiently enabling environment for the adoption of 
BMPs.  
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Table 1. Type of farmer i according to reaction to an external intervention τ  
ϖ =i n   , 0 , 1if 0 and 0i iParticipation Participation= == =τ τ    Never-participant 
ϖ =i c   , 0 , 1if 0 and 1i iParticipation Participation= == =τ τ    Complier 
ϖ =i d   , 0 , 1if 1 and 0i iParticipation Participation= == =τ τ    Defier 
ϖ =i a   , 0 , 1if 1 and 1i iParticipation Participation= == =τ τ    Always-participant 
 
Table 2. Results for z-tests (two-side) of equal proportions of BMP adopters  
  Proportion of adopters 
 
BMPs 
 Control group  
(Std. err.) 
 Treatment group  
(Having a support plan) 
(Std. err.) 
 z statistic  
(Prob. (|z| <|z| )) 
Manure analyses  0.393 (0.065)  0.786  (0.049)  -4.495 (0.000) 
Conservation tillage  0.506 (0.055)  0.683  (0.051)  -2.299 (0.022) 
Immediate incorporation  0.420 (0.059)  0.547 (0.057)  -1.516 (0.130) 
Riparian buffer   0.705 (0.052)  0.605 (0.054)  1.328 (0.184) 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.590 (0.049)  0.756 (0.045)  -2.420 (0.016) 
Hydraulic infrastructures  0.654 (0.053)  0.854 (0.039)  -2.957 (0.003) 
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Figure 1. Histogram of propensity scores for adopters and non-adopters of the selected BMPs 
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Table 3. Balancing test of control variables using the propensity score 
p-values for equality of means in 
the participant and control groups 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Strata 1 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
 Strata 2 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Producer attributes     
Age      
     (0; 35[  0.855  0.806 
     [35; 45[  0.421  0.723 
     [45; 55[   0.358  0.189 
     [55; 65[   0.207  0.319 
     [65;)  0.306  0.227 
Gender (Female=1)  0.160  0.097 
Management experience (years)   0.013  0.024 
Education (> primary=1)  0.099  0.610 
Place of Residence (Farm=1)  0.160  0.255 
Environmental sensitivity (participation in 
biodiversity project or observation of decrease in 
biodiversity =1 )  
 0.617  0.031 
Information  (Use of information provided by the 
phytosanitary alert network=1) 
 0.765  0.224 
External characteristics     
Production losses (losses due to animals/plants =1)  0.665  0.224 
River quality (sand accumulation signs =1)  0.221  0.560 
Region  0.677  0.559 
Farm attributes     
Total gross revenue (TGR)  in $1,000     
     [0; 50[   0.000  0.122 
     [50; 100[  0.953  0.029 
     [100; 250[   0.315  0.925 
     [250; 500[   0.001  0.767 
     [500;)   0.015  0.031 
Main production       
     Animal productions (=1)   0.120  0.523 
Share of the main production in the TGR  0.799  0.401 
Land quality (degradation signs=1)   0.208  0.236 
Ownership type (Individually owned=1)   0.052  0.723 
Share of rented land   0.118  0.604 
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 Table 4. Agri-environmental support plan average treatment effect on treated (ATT) 
BMPs  Average impact  
(Standard deviation) 
 95% confidence interval of the 
average impact 
Manure analyses  0.010 (0.072)  [ 0.005 ; 0.014 ] 
Conservation tillage  0.013 (0.091)   [ 0.003 ; 0.024 ] 
Immediate incorporation  0.093 (0.069)  [ 0.073 ; 0.112 ] 
Riparian buffer  0.020 (0.069)  [0.013 ; 0.027 ] 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.059 (0.033)  [ 0.055 ; 0.063 ] 
Hydraulic infrastructures  -0.002 (0.077)   [ -0.017 ; 0.014 ] 
Confidence intervals (CI) are simulated using bootstrapping methods. 
 
 
Table 5. Agri-environmental advisory clubs network vertical diffusion effect  
BMPs  Average impact      
(Standard deviation) 
 95% confidence interval of the 
average impact 
Manure analysis  0.478 (0.571)  [ 0.426 ; 0.531 ] 
Conservation tillage  0.352 (0.189)  [ 0.333 ; 0.370 ] 
Immediate incorporation  0.252 (1.300)  [ 0.133 ; 0.371 ] 
Riparian buffer  0.067 (0.089)  [ 0.058 ; 0.076 ] 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.415 (0.209)  [ 0.392 ; 0.439 ] 
Hydraulic infrastructures  0.306 (0.161)  [ 0.291 ; 0.321 ] 
Confidence intervals (CI) are simulated using bootstrapping methods. 
 
Table 6. Agri-environmental advisory clubs network horizontal diffusion effects  
BMPs  Average impact        
(Standard deviation) 
 95% confidence interval of the 
average impact 
Manure analyses  0.021 (0.157)  [ 0.008 ; 0.035 ] 
Conservation tillage  -0.028 (0.224)  [-0.047 ; -0.008 ] 
Immediate incorporation  -0.021 (0.459)  [-0.056 ; 0.027 ] 
Riparian buffer  0.027 (0.384)  [ -0.007 ; 0.060 ] 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers  0.131 (0.314)  [ 0.100 ; 0.162 ] 
Hydraulic infrastructures  0.105 (0.268)  [ 0.082 ; 0.129 ] 
Confidence intervals (CI) are simulated using bootstrapping methods. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Summary statistics of controls variables used in the analysis 
Full sample 
(N=190) 
 Treatment group 
(with support plan 
(N=101)) 
 Control group 
(Without support 
plan (N=89)) 
 
 
 
Variables (unity) 
 
Mean Sd. E. 
(mean) 
 Mean Sd. E. 
(mean) 
 Mean Sd. E. 
(mean) 
Producer attributes          
Age           
     (0; 35[  0.084 0.020  0.078 0.028  0.090 0.029 
     [35; 45[  0.205 0.029  0.211 0.043  0.200 0.040 
     [45; 55[ (b)  0.379 0.035  0.322 0.050  0.430 0.050 
     [55; 65[ (b)  0.247 0.031  0.300 0.049  0.200 0.040 
     [65;)  0.084 0.020  0.089 0.030  0.080 0.027 
Gender (Female=1) (a)  0.100 0.022  0.056 0.024  0.140 0.035 
Management experience (years) (a)  22.453 0.870  25.378 1.245  19.820 1.160 
Education (> primary=1)  0.889 0.023  0.911 0.030  0.870 0.034 
Place of Residence (Farm=1)  0.858 0.025  0.867 0.036  0.850 0.036 
Environmental sensitivity (participation in 
biodiversity project or observation of 
decrease in biodiversity =1 ) (a) 
 
0.195 0.029  0.256 0.046  0.140 0.035 
Information  (Use of information provided 
by the phytosanitary alert network=1) 
 0.463 0.036  0.422 0.052  0.500 0.050 
External characteristics          
Production losses (losses due to animals or 
plants =1) 
 0.500 0.036  0.544 0.053  0.460 0.050 
River quality (sand accumulation signs =1)  0.321 0.034  0.367 0.051  0.280 0.045 
Region  11.058 0.420  10.744 0.646  11.340 0.547 
Farm attributes          
Total gross revenue (TGR)  in $1000          
     [0; 50[ (a)  0.232 0.031  0.089 0.030  0.360 0.048 
     [50; 100[  0.105 0.022  0.078 0.028  0.130 0.034 
     [100; 250[ (a)  0.253 0.032  0.278 0.047  0.230 0.042 
     [250; 500[ (a)  0.247 0.031  0.311 0.049  0.190 0.039 
     [500;) (a)  0.163 0.027  0.244 0.046  0.090 0.029 
Main production            
     Animal production (=1) (a)  0.701 0.033  0.756 0.046  0.650 0.048 
Share of the main production in the TGR  0.858 0.013  0.862 0.017  0.854 0.019 
Land quality (degradation signs=1)  (a)  0.511 0.036  0.444 0.053  0.570 0.050 
Ownership type (Individually owned=1) (a)  0.395 0.036  0.333 0.050  0.450 0.050 
Share of rented land (b)  0.267 0.027  0.222 0.033  0.307 0.041 
Note: (a) [(b)] Significantly different means between observations from the treatment group and the control 
group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5 [10] percent level. 
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Table A2. Probit estimation of factors affecting the adoption of a support plan  
 
Variables 
 Coefficient  Marginal 
effect 
 Standard error  Prob.>chi-
square 
Age     
     (0; 35[ -  -  -  - 
     [35; 45[ -0.672  -0.247  0.479  0.160 
     [45; 55[(a) -1.227  -0.441  0.489  0.012 
     [55; 65[ -0.852  -0.308  0.600  0.156 
     [65;) -1.181  -0.367  0.843  0.161 
Gender (Female=1) -0.120  -0.047  0.425  0.777 
Education (>primary=1) (a) 0.961  0.323  0.464  0.038 
Management experience (years) (a) 0.047  0.018  0.017  0.008 
Place of Residence (Farm=1) -0.456  -0.180  0.362  0.208 
Information (Use RAP=1) (b) -0.412  -0.161  0.238  0.083 
Environmental sensitivity (=1) (a)  0.701  0.274  0.302  0.020 
Total gross revenue (TGR) in $1,000        
     [0; 50[(a) -0.843  -0.304  0.394  0.033 
     [50; 100[ -0.468  -0.174  0.439  0.286 
     [100; 250[ -  -  -  - 
     [250; 500[ -0.108  -0.042  0.329  0.744 
     [500;) 0.554  0.218  0.385  0.150 
Share of main production in TGR -0.146  -0.057  0.700  0.835 
Ownership type (sole = 1) 0.444  0.174  0.283  0.117 
Share of rented land (%) 0.138  0.054  0.388  0.722 
Main production        
     Animal productions (=1) (a) -1.389  -0.398  0.623  0.026 
Land quality (Degradation=1) (a) 0.606  0.235  0.254  0.017 
River quality (Degradation=1) 0.061  0.024  0.248  0.804 
Region -0.013  -0.005  0.020  0.508 
Production losses (losses=1) 0.043  0.017  0.246  0.862 
Pseudo R2 0.235       
Note: (a) [(b)] denote significance at 5% [10%] levels (two-tailed test). The marginal effect is calculated at 
the discrete change of binary variables from zero to one. 
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 Table A3. Probit estimation of factors affecting adherence in an agri-environmental advisory club  
 
Variables 
 Coefficient  Marginal 
effect 
 Standard error  Prob.>chi-
square 
Age     
     (0; 35[ -  -  -  - 
     [35; 45[(a) -1.467  -0.367  0.080  0.003 
     [45; 55[(a) -1.395  -0.420  0.120  0.005 
     [55; 65[(a) -1.679  -0.420  0.102  0.009 
     [65;) (a) -2.567  -0.378  0.051  0.005 
Gender (Female=1) 0.079  0.028  0.155  0.854 
Education (>primary=1) -0.346  -0.128  0.167  0.426 
Management experience (a) 0.038  0.013  0.006  0.026 
Place of Residence (Farm=1) 0.521  0.161  0.099  0.165 
Information (Use PAN=1) -0.209  -0.073  0.083  0.387 
Environmental sensitivity (=1)  0.454  0.167  0.118  0.140 
Total gross revenue (TGR) in $1,000        
     [0; 50[(b) -0.793  -0.239  0.103  0.057 
     [50; 100[ -0.002  -0.001  0.151  0.997 
     [100; 250[        
     [250; 500[ -0.225  -0.076  0.112  0.513 
     [500;) 0.434  0.160  0.142  0.240 
Share of main production in TGR 0.393  0.137  0.251  0.586 
Ownership type (sole = 1) 0.040  0.014  0.098  0.887 
Share of rented land (%) 0.230  0.080  0.136  0.558 
Main production        
     Animal productions (=1) (a) -1.803  -0.328  0.051  0.026 
Land quality (Degradation=1) -0.284  -0.099  0.086  0.254 
River quality (Degradation=1) 0.221  0.078  0.090  0.378 
Region (a) -0.054  -0.019  0.007  0.008 
Production losses (losses=1) (a) 0.753  0.258  0.084  0.003 
Pseudo R2 0.213       
Notes: (a) [(b)] denote significance at 5% [10%] levels (two-tailed test). The marginal effect is calculated at 
the discrete change of binary variables from zero to one. 
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Table A4. Agri-environmental advisory clubs network vertical diffusion effect 
 
BMPs  Average impact 
(Std. dev.) 
 95% Confidence interval of 
average impact 
Manure analysis     
 Treatment outcome of compliers  0.821 (0.201)  [ 0.801 ; 0.841 ] 
 Control outcome of compliers  0.342 (0.530)  [ 0.276 ; 0.408 ] 
 Treatment outcome of always-participants  0.763 (0.073)  [ 0.755 ; 0.772 ] 
 Control outcome of never-participants  0.476 (0.008)  [ 0.461 ; 0.491 ] 
Conservation tillage     
 Treatment outcome of compliers  0.943 (0.100)  [ 0.933 ; 0.952] 
 Control outcome of compliers  0.591 (0.163)  [ 0.574 ; 0.608 ] 
 Treatment outcome of always-participants  0.486 (0.004)  [ 0.479 ; 0.493 ] 
 Control outcome of never-participants  0.440 (0.007)  [ 0.427 ; 0.453 ] 
Immediate incorporation     
 Treatment outcome of compliers  0.634 (0.208)  [ 0.614 ; 0.655 ] 
 Control outcome of compliers  0.382 (1.316)  [ 0.223 ; 0.541 ] 
 Treatment outcome of always-participants  0.577 (0.004)  [ 0.569 ; 0.585 ] 
 Control outcome of never-participants  0.402 (0.006)  [ 0.391 ; 0.414 ] 
Riparian buffer     
 Treatment outcome of compliers  0.997 (0.026)  [ 0.994 ; 0.999 ] 
 Control outcome of compliers  0.930 (0.086)  [ 0.921 ; 0.938 ] 
 Treatment outcome of always-participants  0.455 (0.003)  [ 0.449 ; 0.460 ] 
 Control outcome of never-participants  0.509 (0.005)  [ 0.499 ; 0.519 ] 
Non-use of mineral fertilizers     
 Treatment outcome of compliers  0.911 (0.128)  [ 0.897 ; 0.924 ] 
 Control outcome of compliers  0.495 (0.172)  [ 0.480 ; 0.511 ] 
 Treatment outcome of always-participants  0.641 (0.004)  [ 0.634 ; 0.649 ] 
 Control outcome of never-participants  0.660 (0.006)  [ 0.649 ; 0.671 ] 
Hydraulic infrastructures     
 Treatment outcome of compliers  0.947 (0.090)  [ 0.934 ; 0.957 ] 
 Control outcome of compliers  0.642 (0.144)  [ 0.627 ; 0.657 ] 
 Treatment outcome of always-participants  0.803 (0.003)  [ 0.797 ; 0.808 ] 
 Control outcome of never-participants  0.690 (0.007)  [ 0.675 ; 0.704 ] 
 
 
